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Abstract
This paper reconsiders the explanation of R&D subsidies by Spencer and
Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to license their innovations and
to pool their R&D investments. We show that in equilibrium R&D joint ven-
tures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic
benefits of R&D investment in the export oligopoly game. Nevertheless, na-
tional governments are driven to subsidize their own national firms in order
to increase their strength in the joint venture bargaining game. Therefore,
our analysis suggests an alternative explanation of the observed prolifera-
tion of R&D subsidies.
JEL Classifications: L13, O34
Keywords: Patent licensing, industrial organization, R&D subsidies, research
joint ventures, innovation policy.
1. introduction
In a seminal paper Spencer and Brander (1983) analyze international R&D
rivalry and show that nation states have an incentive to subsidize R&D ex-
penditures of their home based export industries to give them a strategic
advantage in the subsequent export market game. In equilibrium all nations
engage in such activities, which makes the attempts to gain an advantage
self-defeating. Governments are thus caught in a dilemma: as they all pay
subsidies, their welfare is reduced; yet, for each single nation the alternative
of no subsidization reduces welfare even more.
Spencer and Brander (1983) propose their model as an explanation of the
observed proliferation of R&D subsidies. And they suggest that this explana-
tion becomes increasingly relevant as international agreements ban export
subsidies that, in the past, served a similar purpose.1
This explanation of R&D subsidies is similar in spirit to a number of con-
tributions that explain the strategic benefit of commitment devices in an
oligopoly context. For example, Fershtman and Judd (1987) show that the
owner of an oligopolistic firm can effectively mimic a Stackelberg leader by
delegating decisions to a manager who is rewarded for aggressive behavior,
for example by appropriately rewarding a combination of sales and profits.
Yet, in equilibrium, all owners of firms make use of that device; hence, in
equilibrium, strategic delegation to managers is self-defeating.
The present paper revisits the Spencer and Brander (1983) analysis. The
motivation for our analysis is the observation that in a Cournot market game
firms have an incentive to license their innovations to competitors2 and to
pool their R&D investments.
We introduce the possibility of pooling R&D investments and licensing inno-
vations into the Spencer and Brander analysis. This drastically changes the
equilibrium outcome. In particular, R&D subsidies no longer grant a strate-
gic advantage in the Cournot market game, since efficient licensing gives
rise to equal marginal costs to all firms, regardless of which firm is subsi-
dized by its government. Nevertheless, governments still tend to subsidize
their domestic firms to give them an advantage in the bargaining game that
determines how the costs and benefits of the innovation are shard. These
subsidies do not only play an entirely different role, they are also lower than
the subsidies that solve the Spencer and Brander (1983) model. Therefore,
our analysis suggests an alternative explanation of observed R&D subsidies.
There is a large literature on international R&D rivalry and R&D subsidies,
and on research joint ventures (RJVs) and licensing. For example, Cheng
(1987) considers a dynamic version of the Spencer and Brander (1983) model
1See also Brander and Spencer (1983) and Brander (1995).
2Generally, the literature has observed that an “outside” patent holder, who is not also
a user of that innovation, should auction a limited number of licenses (see Kamien (1992)),
whereas an “insider” should use royalty contracts (see, Wang (1998)).
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with R&D spillovers which reinforces their results. Bagwell and Staiger (1994)
extend the Spencer-Brander model to include R&D uncertainty. They show
that governments tend to subsidize their domestic firms’ R&D activities re-
gardless of whether there is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. And
Qiu and Tao (1998) show that R&D cooperation tends to further increase the
governments’ incentive to subsidize their national firms’ R&D investments.
Research joint ventures have become increasingly popular ever since the
National Corporation Research Act was passed in the U.S. in 1984, and simi-
lar legislation was passed in the European Union in 1985, taking exemption
from Article 85 for certain R&D arrangements. Numerous research papers
have analyzed various kinds of RJVs, ranging from R&D cooperation, where
firms only coordinate their R&D investments, to RJV cartelization, where
firms coordinate or even jointly conduct their R&D activities and share inno-
vations but remain competitors in the product market (see Kamien, Muller,
and Zang (1992) and Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002)).
Like the literature on RJV cartelization we assume that firms coordinate and
jointly conduct their R&D activities, and share innovations. However, we go
one step further and assume that firms write an optimal RJV contract that
includes royalty licensing of innovations to member firms. By intelligently
using royalty rates, firms can prevent the increased competition that would
occur if innovations were simply passed on for free to the members of the
RJV. This use of royalty licensing as part of an optimal RJV contract is an
essential ingredient of our analysis.
We also mention that firms do not only have an incentive to license their in-
novation to competitors; they are often given additional incentives to do so.
For example, the European Community provides subsidies to foster R&D co-
operation. Some of these programs, e.g. EUREKA, are financed by each firm’s
home government. Moreover, programs such as ESPRIT or RACE require
a result-sharing agreement between the cooperating firms (Fölster, 1995).
Such arrangements have become fairly widespread.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model. Sec-
tion 3 explains why and how we model the pooling of R&D investments com-
bined with the licensing of innovations. Section 4 solves the game without
RJVs and licensing, which serves as our benchmark model. Section 5 solves
the subgame perfect equilibrium of the full game with RJVs and licensing
and compares it with that of the benchmark model. Section 6 specializes to
a linear model, states necessary and sufficient conditions for positive sub-
sidies and for drastic and non-drastic innovations, and summarizes some
comparative statics. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of some critical
issues.
2
2. the model
We employ the model of R&D rivalry introduced by Spencer and Brander
(1983) as our base model. In that base model, two firms, one in each of
two countries, serve the same export market in a third country. That export
market is a homogeneous good Cournot duopoly under complete informa-
tion. Before choosing their outputs firms engage in cost reducing R&D, the
results of which become common knowledge. And before they play the R&D
and subsequent Cournot market games, national governments may offer an
input based R&D subsidy with the intention of giving their own national firm
a competitive advantage.
We extend that base model by allowing firms to pool their R&D investments
and set up a R&D joint venture (RJV) combined with licensing the innovation
to its members.
This is done in the framework of the following sequential stage game:
Stage 1 Governments simultaneously choose the R&D subsidy rates, si, per
unit of R&D investment, xi. Their choice becomes public information.
Stage 2 Firms either set up a R&D joint venture and negotiate the terms
of the joint ownership cum licensing contract, and invest accordingly,
or go alone and simultaneously choose their R&D investments (the de-
tailed assumption are spelled out in Section 3.).
Stage 3 Firms observe the R&D investments and terms of the licensing con-
tract and play a Cournot market game.
Firms maximize profits, and governments maximize welfare which, in the
present framework, is the difference between their domestic firm’s profit
and the subsidy paid to that firm.
We denote outputs by q := (q1, q2), aggregate output by Q := q1 + q2, the
inverse market demand function by P(Q), firms’ unit cost before the inno-
vation by c, firms’ R&D investment by x := (x1, x2), the R&D production
function by f(xi), and subsidy rates by s := (s1, s2).
Inverse demand is twice continuously differentiable with P ′(Q) < 0 and
∂
∂qj
(
P ′(Q)qi
)
< 0, i, j = 1,2. The latter assures that the q’s are strategic
substitutes and also that firms’ profits are strictly concave functions of their
own output.
The R&D production function f(x) indicates the cost reduction caused by
an investment x. It is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable with
f ′(x) > 0, f ′′(x) < 0 everywhere. Finally, the initial unit cost is such that
both firms serve the market if they do not innovate, i.e., 0 ≤ c < P(0).
We rule out “drastic” innovations, i.e. we assume that the innovation sub-
game does not have an equilibrium that implements monopoly. In Section
6. we will show exactly how this constrains the choice of the function f .
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3. research joint venture cum licensing
Starting from the base model firms have an incentive to pool their R&D
investments and to license their innovation. We take this into account by
including an additional stage to the base game in which firms negotiate the
formation of an R&D joint venture (RJV) combined with a licensing scheme.
If these negotiations fail, firms go alone and simultaneously choose their
investments x, as in the base model by Spencer and Brander (1983).
We characterize the RJV by a contract (xL, rL, t1, t2) that stipulates the level
of the joint R&D investment, xL, the licensing fee, rL, and the transfers to its
members, (t1, t2). In principle, such a contract can take many forms. How-
ever, in order to maximize the gains from the joint venture, the following
properties must be satisfied:
1. The joint R&D investment, xL, should maximize the sum total of firms’
net profits.
2. The license fee rL should be a royalty rate per output unit that is equal
to the cost reduction due to the innovation, i.e. rL = f(xL); as a re-
sult, the effective unit cost is made equal to the unit cost before the
innovation, c + rL − f(xL) = c.
3. The transfers should solve the Nash bargaining game between the
members of the RJV subject to budget and participation constraints.
The choice of license fee is rationalized as follows. If firms pay no royalty
per output unit, their unit cost is diminished by the innovation which gives
rise to more aggressive behavior in the Cournot market game and hence to
a mutual destruction of profits. This can only be prevented by arranging
licensing in the form of a royalty rate rL where rL is set equal to the cost
difference caused by the innovation, i.e. rL = f(xL). This way, the effective
unit cost, i.e. the unit cost plus royalty fee, is equal to the unit cost before
the innovation, which completely neutralizes the competition effect of the
innovation.3
4. the benchmark case without rjvs and licensing
In this section, we briefly review the game without RJV and licensing, which
serves as benchmark. This game corresponds to the model by Spencer and
Brander (1983).
3One may ask: why not set an even higher royalty rate at such a level that the monopoly
solution is implemented? We assume that this would lead to intervention by the antitrust
authorities in the export market. Therefore, the RJV cannot raise the effective unit cost
above the level of the pre-innovation unit cost c.
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The subgame perfect equilibrium of that game consists of the equilibrium
strategies σ := (qN(x),xN(s), sN) and the payoff functions of the Cournot,
R&D investment, and subsidy subgames:
Πi(q,xi, si) := (P(Q)− c + f(xi)) qi − (1− si)xi (1)
ΠNi (x, si) :=Πi(qN(x),xi, si) (2)
GNi (s) :=ΠN
∗
i (s)− sixNi (s), (3)
where
ΠN
∗
i (s) := ΠNi (xN(s), si). (4)
The strategies σ are a subgame perfect equilibrium if for all i = 1,2:
∂Πi
∂qi
∣∣∣∣∣
q=qN(x)
≤ 0, and qNi (x)
∂Πi
∂qi
∣∣∣∣∣
q=qN(x)
= 0, ∀x, s (5)
∂ΠNi
∂xi
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xN(s)
≤ 0, and xNi (s)
∂ΠNi
∂xi
∣∣∣∣∣
x=xN(s)
= 0, ∀s (6)
∂GNi
∂si
∣∣∣∣∣
s=sN
≤ 0 and sNi
∂GNi
∂si
∣∣∣∣∣
s=sN
= 0, (7)
provided the second order conditions are satisfied.4
If drastic innovations are excluded, the game may have a symmetric equi-
librium in which both firms choose the same equilibrium outputs and the
same R&D investments, and governments choose the same subsidy rates. If
such an equilibrium exists, one has:
Proposition 1 (Spencer and Brander (1983)) If the benchmark game has
a symmetric equilibrium, the equilibrium subsidy rates are
sN1 = sN2 =
∂ΠN
∗
i (s)
∂xj
∂xNj (s)
∂si
∂xNi (s)
∂si
=: sN. (8)
In section 6. we solve a linear example and state necessary and sufficient
conditions for existence of a symmetric equilibrium with and without sub-
sidies, and for drastic and non-drastic innovations.
5. solution of the full game with rjvs and licensing
We now characterize the joint venture and subsequent Cournot subgames
for arbitrarily given nonnegative subsidy rates s.
4The assumptions concerning P assure concavity ofΠi(q,xi, si) in qi. However, suitable
concavity properties of ΠNi (x, si) and G
N
i (s) in xi resp. si must also be satisfied.
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As we already pointed out, the joint venture contract {rL, xL, t1, t2} pre-
scribes royalty licensing with the royalty rate rL = f(xL) and fixed transfers
from the RJV to firms, t := (t1, t2). An immediate implication is that in
the subsequent Cournot subgame the effective unit cost of member firms is
equal to the pre–innovation unit cost c. Member firms thus maximize their
operating profit plus transfer payment, πi(q, c)+ ti, by choosing their own
output qi, where the operating profit πi is a function of q, as follows:
πi(q, c) := (P(Q)− c + f(xL)− r)qi
=(P(Q)− c)qi.
(9)
Obviously, the maximizer of πi(q, c) + ti is the same as that of πi(q, c).
Therefore,
Proposition 2 (Cournot Subgames) The equilibrium strategies of the Cournot
subgames, qL(x), are
qLi (x) =
⎧⎨
⎩q
N
0 if the RJV was formed
qNi (x) otherwise,
(10)
where qN0 := qNi (0) (which is the symmetric equilibrium output in the bench-
mark case without licensing forx = 0 (see (5)). And the associated equilibrium
operating profit if a RJV is formed is
πL := π(qN0 , qN0 , c) (11)
Using this result the other elements of the equilibriumRJV contract {t(s), x∗L (s)}
have to maximize the total surplus of the firms that form the RJV,
max
xL
Φ(xL, s) := 2πL + 2f(xL)qN0 − (1− s1 − s2)xL, (12)
and solve the following Nash bargaining problem (subject to budget (14) and
participation constraints (15)):
max
t1,t2
(
πL + t1 −ΠN∗1 (s)
)(
πL + t2 −ΠN∗2 (s)
)
(13)
s.t. t1 + t2 = 2f
(
x∗L (s)
)
qN0 − x∗L (s) (1− s1 − s2) (14)
πL + ti ≥ ΠN∗i (s), i = 1,2. (15)
Proposition 3 (Joint Venture Subgame) In equilibrium, the RJV is formed
and the RJV contracts for all possible RJV subgames, {rL(s), x∗L (s), t(s)}, are
characterized as follows:
rL(s) = f(x∗L (s)) (16)
f ′(x∗L (s))2q
N
0 = 1− s1 − s2 (17)
ΠLi (s) := πL + ti(s) =
ΦL(s)+ΠN∗i (s)−ΠN
∗
j (s)
2
, i, j = 1,2, i ≠ j (18)
ΦL(s) := Φ(x∗L (s), s) (19)
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Proof: We already showed that (16) is the optimal royalty rate. (17) is
the first order condition of (12); therefore, (17) characterizes the optimal
R&D investment x∗L (s). It remains to be shown that the RJV is formed and
that equilibrium transfers are characterized by (18), (19). This is shown,
in two steps, as follows: we solve the restricted Nash bargaining problem
that ignores the two participation constraints (15), and then show that the
solution of the restricted bargaining problem actually satisfies the omitted
constraints.
Substituting the budget constraint (14) into the Nash product (13), the re-
stricted Nash bargaining problem reduces to the maximization of
max
t1
(
πL + t1 −ΠN∗1 (s)
)(
ΦL(s)−πL − t1 −ΠN∗2 (s)
)
. (20)
Computing the first order condition and using (15) one obtains the two equi-
librium transfers and thus the total payoffs of the two member firms as
stated in (18), (19).
Finally, compute the difference ΠLi (s)−ΠN
∗
i (s), for i, j = 1,2, i ≠ j, and one
finds, by the fact that ΦL(s) is the maximum sum of profits,
ΠLi (s)−ΠN
∗
i (s) =
1
2
(
ΦL(s)−
(
ΠN
∗
i (s)+ΠN
∗
j (s)
))
≥ 0. (21)
This confirms that the participation constraints omitted in the restricted
Nash bargaining problem are indeed not binding and the RJV is formed.

Finally, we use the subgame perfect equilibrium of the RJV subgames to
solve the subsidy game played between national governments whose payoff
function is GLi (s) = ΠLi (s)(s)− six∗L (s).
The first order conditions of government i are: ∂GLi /∂si ≤ 0, and si∂GLi /∂si =
0, where
∂GLi (s)
∂si
=
(
∂ΦL(s)
∂si
− 2x∗L (s)− 2si
∂x∗L (s)
∂si
)
+
(
∂ΠN
∗
1 (s)
∂si
− ∂Π
N∗
2 (s)
∂si
)
. (22)
Proposition 4 Suppose the functions GLi (s) are concave in si. Then, the
introduction of RJVs and licensing does not eliminate the incentive to subsidize
R&D investments. However, compared to the benchmark game, it gives rise
to lower equilibrium subsidy rates.
Proof: We evaluate the partial derivatives ∂GLi (s)/∂si at the point where
s = (sN, sN) and show that they are negative. Since these derivatives are
monotone decreasing (by the assumed concavity), the equilibrium subsidy
rate sL must be lower than sN .
First, notice that the term in the second parenthesis on the RHS of (22)
vanishes. Since (sN, sN) is an equilibrium of the game without licensing.
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By the first order conditions of government i in the game without licensing
(where sN = (sN, sN),
∂GL1(s1, sN)
∂s1
∣∣∣∣∣
s=sN
=
(
∂ΠN
∗
1 (s)
∂s1
− xN1 (s)− sN
∂xNi (s)
∂s1
)∣∣∣∣∣
s=sN
= 0 (23)
∂GL2(sN, s2)
∂s2
∣∣∣∣∣
s=sN
=
(
∂ΠN
∗
2 (s)
∂s2
− xN2 (s)− sN
∂xN2 (s)
∂s2
)∣∣∣∣∣
s=sN
= 0. (24)
Of course, s = sN impliesxN1 (s) = xN2 (s). Therefore, by (23)–(24), ∂ΠN
∗
1 /∂s1 =
∂ΠN
∗
2 /∂s2.
Next, observe that, due to the first order condition concerning xL, eq. (17),
∂ΦL(s)
∂si
=f ′(x∗L (s))
∂x∗L (s)
∂si
QL + x∗L (s)− (1− si − sj)
∂x∗L (s)
∂si
=x∗L (s)
(25)
Therefore, combining these results, one obtains
∂GLi (s)
∂si
∣∣∣∣∣
s=sN
= −
(
x∗L (s)− 2sN
∂x∗L (s)
∂si
)∣∣∣∣∣
s=sN
< 0, (26)
as asserted. 
We conclude that subsidies are also a feature of the model with RJVs and
licensing. However, they serve an entirely different purpose than in the
Spencer and Brander (1983) model. When RJVs and licensing are feasible,
firms no longer use R&D investments to gain a strategic advantage in the
Cournot market game. And therefore, governments can no longer use sub-
sidies to enhance their domestic firms’ share in the export market. The only
purpose of subsidies is to improve the position of their domestic firm in the
bargaining over the division of the RJV’s profit. The level of equilibrium sub-
sidies depends upon the productivity of R&D investment, as we will show
explicitly in the following linear example.
6. a linear example
We now consider a linear version of the above models. This permits us to
explicitly solve the game and to illustrate our results.
We parameterize the productivity of R&D investment by an efficiency para-
meter γ and with slight abuse of notation now write f as a function of x
and γ.
Let P(Q) := 1−q1−q2, f (xi, γ) := √xi/γ, where γ is an efficiency parameter
(a higher γ indicates lower R&D efficiency). Also, we normalize the before-
innovation unit cost to c = 0.
We characterize the symmetric equilibrium, and derive conditions on γ that
assure existence of such an equilibrium and rule out drastic innovations that
implement monopoly.
8
6.1. Equilibrium subsidies in the absence of licensing
In the no-licensing case, the equilibrium outputs in the production stage are
qNi (x) =
γ + 2√xi −√xj
3γ
. (27)
Given the subsidy rates s, the equilibrium investments in R&D are
xNi (s, γ) =
4
(
2γ − 3(1− sj)γ3
)2
A
(28)
A := (4− 12(2− si − sj)γ2 + 27(1− si)(1− sj)γ4)2. (29)
Firms’ equilibrium profits in the R&D subgame and the governments’ payoff
functions are,
ΠN
∗
i (s, γ) =
(
9(1− si)γ2 − 4
)
(1− si)
(
2γ − 3(1− sj)γ3
)2
A
(30)
GNi (s, γ) =
(
9(1− si)2γ2 − 4
)(
2γ − 3(1− sj)γ3
)2
A
(31)
And the symmetric equilibrium subsidy rate is
sN1 (γ) = sN2 (γ) =
3γ2 − 1−
√
1− 10γ2 + 9γ4
6γ2
=: sN(γ), i = 1,2. (32)
Proposition 5 (Benchmark Model) Consider the linear model. The equi-
librium subsidy rates of the benchmark model are positive if and only γ ≥ 1.
Note, a low γ means high productivity of R&D investment. Therefore, gov-
ernment subsidies have a role to play only if that productivity is sufficiently
low. In turn, if γ < 1, productivity of R&D investment is high, and it becomes
optimal for governments to actually tax R&D investments.
6.2. Equilibrium subsidies with licensing
The linear version of the game with licensing has the following solution:
The equilibrium outputs are obviously qLi (0) = 13 ; therefore, QL = 23 . The
equilibrium investment is
x∗L (s, γ) =
1
9(1− s1 − s2)2γ2 . (33)
And the equilibrium transfers from licensing are
ΠLi (s, γ) =
1+ 2(1− si − sj)γ2
18(1− si − sj)γ2 +
ΠN
∗
i (s, γ)−ΠN
∗
j (s, γ)
2
(34)
9
The symmetric equilibrium subsidy rate, s1 = s2 = sL, solves the following
first order condition (recall, subsidy rates cannot be negative)
∂GLi (si, sL, γ)
∂si
∣∣∣∣∣
si=sL
= 1
18
(
1+ 2sL
(2sL − 1)3γ2
+ 72γ
2(1− 3(1− sL)γ2)
(2− 3(1− sL)γ2)(2− 9(1− sL)γ2)2
)
≤ 0.
(35)
Proposition 6 (Full Model) Consider the linear model. If RJV (combined
with licensing) are allowed for, governments subsidize their domestic firm’s
R&D investments if and only if 1 < γ < 2.62.
Proof: As one can easily confirm,
∂GLi (si,0,γ)
∂si
≤ 0 if γ ≥ 2.62 or γ < 1.
Therefore, sL = 0 is a solution of (35), i.e. the equilibrium is a corner solu-
tion, for all 1 > γ and γ ≥ 2.62. Whereas, if 1 < γ < 2.62, ∂G
L
i (sL,sL,γ)
∂si
= 0 for
some sL > 0. 
We mention that γ = 1 is a borderline case in which no solution exists.
Therefore, the set of R&D efficiency parameter γ for which equilibrium sub-
sidies are positive is bounded.
6.3. Exclusion of “drastic innovations”
As we now show, the conditions concerning γ that assure existence of a
symmetric equilibrium also imply that the game has no equilibria that im-
plement monopoly.
Proposition 7 (Non-drastic innovation) Consider the linear model. The
R&D subgames have no asymmetric equilibria that implement monopoly if
and only if γ >
√
2
3 .
Proof: Without loss of generality, consider firm1 as the potentialmonopoly.
Denote the smallest R&D investment by firm 1 that crowds out firm 2, pro-
vided firm 2 has made no R&D investment, by x¯1, and the associated equi-
librium output by q¯1. Then, (q¯1, x¯1) must satisfy the conditions:
P(q¯1) =c = 0 (36)(
P(q¯1)q¯1
)′ = − f(x¯1). (37)
The first condition assures that q2 = 0 is a best reply to (q¯1, x¯1), and the
second assures that (q¯1, x¯1) is firm 1’s best reply to q2 = 0. Therefore,
f(x¯1) = −P ′(q¯1)q¯1 = 1, x¯1 = γ2. (38)
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Now suppose the game has an asymmetric equilibrium withx = x¯ := (x¯1,0),
qN1 (x), q
N
2 (x) which then yields the monopoly outcome since q
N
1 (x¯) = q¯1
and qN2 (x¯) = 0. Then, x1 = x¯1 must be a best reply to x2 = x¯2 = 0. However,
by (27), one has
d
dx1
Π1
(
qN1 (x), q
N
2 (x),x1
)∣∣∣∣
x2=0
=0 ⇐⇒ x1 = 4γ
2
(9γ2 − 4)2 =: x
∗
1 .
Therefore, x∗1 is the best reply to x2 = 0 and x∗1 < x¯1 ⇐⇒ γ >
√
2
3 , and
we conclude that the game has no asymmetric equilibrium that implements
monopoly if and only if γ >
√
2
3 . 
The condition in Lemma 7 is equivalent to the exclusion of a “drastic” inno-
vation.
6.4. Comparison of equilibrium outcomes
Table 1 states the symmetric equilibrium outcomes; the subsidy rates, sN, sL,
and (with slight abuse of notation) the R&D investments, xN,xL , total sub-
sidy levels, Sj := 2sjxj , j = N,L, and profits, for different values of the
efficiency parameter γ for the games with and without licensing.5
R&D efficiency parameter γ
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 3 17
sN .119 .075 .053 .040 .031 .025 .021 .018 .013 .000
sL .107 .063 .039 .025 .016 .009 .004 .000 .000 .000
xN .065 .038 .026 .019 .015 .012 .010 .008 .006 → 0
xL .125 .074 .051 .038 .030 .024 .020 .016 .012 → 0
SN .015 .006 .003 .002 .001 .001 → 0 → 0 → 0 → 0
SL .027 .009 .004 .002 .001 → 0 → 0 → 0 → 0 → 0
ΠN
∗
i .106 .109 .110 .110 .111 .111 .111 .111 .111 .111
ΠLi .160 .144 .135 .129 .125 .123 .121 .119 .117 .111
Table 1: Equilibrium outcomes with and without licensing
This shows that all these variables, except ΠN , are monotone increasing in
R&D efficiency (measured by a decreasing γ). Only ΠN is decreasing in R&D
efficiency, which is due to the fact that, in the absence of RJVs and licensing
the higher subsidy rates induced by increased R&D efficiency make firms
compete more vigorously in the export market, as we know already from
Spencer and Brander (1983). Moreover, it shows how the introduction of
RJVs and licensing lowers the equilibrium subsidy rate for each given γ
and reaches sL = 0 for all g > 2.62 while sN approaches zero only as γ
approaches 17 (from below).
5Note, efficiency of R&D investment is decreasing in γ.
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7. conclusion
The present paper has reconsidered the explanation of R&D subsidies by
Spencer and Brander (1983) and others. We enriched their model by allowing
firms to form a RJV that pools R&D investments and licenses innovations.
This modification has drastic implications. In equilibrium, firms form a
RJV and write a optimal contract that makes the innovation available to all
member firms in exchange for royalties based on a fixed royalty rate. That
rate is set in such a way that innovations do not change the intensity of
competition.
As a result, governments cannot use R&D subsidies to enhance their do-
mestic firms’ market share, and therefore the explanation of R&D subsidies
proposed by Spencer and Brander (1983) no longer holds. Nevertheless, gov-
ernments still subsidize R&D investments, although to a smaller extent, but
only in order to improve their firms’ bargaining position in RJV subgame.
A critical assumption of our analysis is that the RJV can commit to pay
out transfers to its members before the market game is played. Therefore,
transfers must be independent of how firms actually behave in the market
game. In other words, the RJV must stick to the RJV contract even if firms
later act in an unexpected way that gives rise to either a budget surplus
or deficit. Such commitment power may be difficult to achieve if the RJV
is co-owned by its member firms. However, firms can, as an alternative,
replace the RJV by an independent firm, provided this independent firm
is endowed with sufficient financial resources to bear a potential deficit.
Also, the independent firm must be bound by a contract that requires the
innovation to be licensed to both firms.6
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